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THE ENLIGHTENMENT:  JOHN MESSLIER 
 
 
 Today many exceptions seem obvious relevant to the historic 
advance of secularism from the Renaissance to the Reformation 
followed by the Enlightenment.  However, a basic transition seems to 
have sustained itself over many decades in the modern recovery of 
religious disbelief ultimately derivative of pre-Socratic philosophy 
consolidated by Aristotle.  For example, the two years of 1610-1611 
seem to have set the stage for all three of the later historic epochs, the 
Renaissance followed by the Reformation and Enlightenment. The 
King James translation of the Bible in 1611 might have been a major 
achievement of the English Reformation just preceding Milton, but 
Shakespeare's final play, “The Tempest,” produced the same year, 
effectively brought the English Renaissance to a close as suggested by 
its secular wording, "What's past is prologue," "Oh brave new world," 
and, most tellingly, "We are such stuff as dreams are made on, and 
our little life is rounded with a sleep" as opposed to the promise of 
heavenly infinitude.  Similarly, Ben Jonson's stage satire “The 
Alchemist,” first produced in 1610, invoked a level of skepticism that 
both anticipated and exceeded the conventions of Restoration 
comedy that followed.  
 
 On the other hand, two unfortunate young Englishmen, 
Bartholomew Legate and Edward Wightman, were actually 
burned at the stake in 1611 for espousing Unitarian views.  Their 
shared executions apparently terminated this medieval practice in 
Great Britain, but in doing so they nevertheless exemplified the 
most repulsive aspect of the Reformation obviously connected 
with the Inquisition just a few centuries earlier.  Not more than a 
century later, a remarkable example of historic simultaneity 
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occurred in the American colonies, when Jonathan Edwards and 
Benjamin Franklin lived as contemporaries but with values and 
opinions radically different from each other.  With vigorous 
righteousness, Edwards renewed the witchcraft trials of the 
Reformation on American soil at roughly the same time as 
Franklin promoted a variety of secular issues typical of the 
Enlightenment—from democratic governance to the invention of 
electricity.  In effect Edwards primarily addressed religious 
concerns in light of rigorous puritanism whereas Franklin featured 
innovations expressive of a strictly secular perspective.  
 
 In France, Pyrrhonism and Academic skepticism, the two 
principal modes of skepticism inspired by classical sources, more 
or less took root as a clandestine secular tradition throughout the 
seventeenth century, while a more confrontational hostility to 
religion gathered momentum that culminated with the deist trend 
in both England and France.  It has been estimated that as many as 
a hundred manuscripts were in circulation in France advocating 
the deist cause as early as the turn of the eighteenth century. This 
might have occurred as a two-decade lag compared to the deist 
trend in England, but with essentially the same collective purpose 
in opposition to Biblical authority.  Catholicism continued to 
prevail in France as promoted by experienced priests, but the 
Bible’s textual validity apart from the role of the Church became a 
serious matter for debate by French deists as well as sympathizers 
in England.  Spinoza initiated this task in continental Europe, and 
England’s assortment of deists pursued the cause inspired by the 
writings of Blount, Toland, and Collins.  For if the Bible itself was 
vulnerable to challenge based on its many contradictions and 
inaccuracies, an entire millennium of scholastic philosophy could 
also be rejected.  
 
 In effect a tectonic shift in collective ideology seems to have 
occurred based a deist rejection of numerous orthodox Christian 
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assumptions.  As promised in his first book, Against the Academics, 
St. Augustine had long since initiated scholastic philosophy as 
much as anything to dispense with the secular transgressions of 
classical philosophy that had yet to be eradicated except for Plato’s 
doctrine.  Similarly, Christianity itself could be challenged in later 
centuries because of the fallibility of Biblical information beyond 
minor textual adjustments.  Just as Augustine’s scholarship had 
played a substantial role in consolidating the collective rejection of 
secular philosophy, the likelihood of flaws in the Bible encouraged 
the resurrection of secular philosophy at odds with religious 
demands. For if the Bible could be shown to have contained a 
large variety of probable historical inaccuracies, many centuries of 
scholastic effort rooted in Biblical assumptions could be dismissed 
on a similar basis.  
 
 In effect the deist trend in France emerged as an 
underground movement just a few years after its earlier 
breakthrough in England. Within the second decade of the 
eighteenth century, the anonymous text Le Militaire philosophe, ou 
difficultés sur la religion, proposes au Malebranche, prêtre de l’Oratoire 
was circulated to challenge the likelihood of Christ’s miracles as 
well as transubstantiation, the Apocrypha, and various Christian 
practices similar to those of pagan religion. As early as 1722, N. 
Fréret published a Lettre de Thrasybule à Leucippe that also featured 
the resemblance between Christianity and contemporary pagan 
religions.  Between 1722 and 1740, C. Dumarsais published Analyse 
de la religion chrétienne to point out discrepancies between the Old 
and New Testaments as well as rejecting the validity of various 
miracles and prophecies attributed to Christ.  At about the same 
time, Lévesque de Burigny published Examen critique des apologists 
de la religion chrétienne to explore in depth the divergent beliefs of 
early Christian sects as well as a random assortment of miracles 
and prophecies.1 All of these authors were deists in the sense that 
they continued to accept the notion of a single all-powerful God, 
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but most of them questioned the final validity of the Bible as well 
as various aspects of Christian doctrine relevant to God’s final 
authority.  They did not go as far as Spinoza’s pantheism in 
identifying God with the universe itself, but they did concur with 
his critique of the Old Testament in his Treatise on Religion and 
Political Philosophy, and they extended his skepticism to the New 
Testament as well. 
 
 In his pivotal two-volume History of Freethought, published 
in 1936, J.M. Robertson devoted eight pages of small print to list 
all the French publications he could find relevant to freethought 
inclusive of deism and atheism through the entire eighteenth 
century.2 Aside from their contents, the numerical momentum of 
the published texts that remain available today in the French 
language suggests an obvious rise and fall of this remarkable 
hundred-year trend:      
 
  1700-1709   5 
  1710-1719   5 
  1720-1729   3 
  1730-1739  11 
  1740-1749  13 
  1750-1759  25 
  1760-1769  44 
  1770-1779  25 
  1780-1789  15 
  1790-1799   7  
 
The definitive pattern of growth and decline disclosed by these 
numbers compiled by Robertson indicates modest activity during 
the first three decades, a doubling during the next two decades 
followed by an unprecedented and seemingly inexplicable surge 
over the following three decades, and finally an obvious relapse to 
earlier levels over the final two decades.  Exactly why?  As in the 
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history of English deism that had already come to the fore at the 
beginning of the century, at least a dozen secular publications by 
French iconoclasts seem to have been in wide circulation during 
this period.  The trend would seem to have reached its peak by the 
1760s, at least a decade and a half preceding the American 
Revolution, and, significantly, all the major French secularists 
during this period died at least half a decade preceding the 1789 
French Revolution.  In retrospect, the pivotal figure who seems to 
have been the most responsible in having initiated this major 
transitional phase was Jean Meslier, an obscure French priest who 




 As an otherwise inconspicuous Catholic village priest, Jean 
Meslier (1664-1729?), effectively promoted an uncompromising 
version of atheism based on the radical assumption that no God 
whatsoever exists that exercises ultimate authority pertaining to 
human destiny as well as the physical universe as a whole. Many 
centuries earlier, classical Greek atheists had maintained this 
stance on a similar basis as documented in my recently published 
history, An Archaeology of Disbelief.  Perhaps a half dozen Greek 
philosophers shared this conviction, and during the Middle Ages 
more than a thousand years later a large number of so-called 
heretics were burned at the stake for their impiety in adhering to 
comparable assumptions. Later, during the Renaissance, Spinoza’s 
pantheism served as a major departure from Christian orthodoxy, 
and such English figures as Thomas Kidd, Christopher Marlowe, 
Sir Walter Raleigh, and the Earl of Rochester were also justifiably 
suspected of atheism.  These individuals seem to have freely 
expressed their doubts at least in private conversations among 
themselves and their friends, but there is no evidence of their 
commitment to impiety in their published writings. A few such as 
both Collins and Tindal among English deists even seem to have 
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been willing to identify themselves as atheists now and again, if in 
fact this disclosure a couple hundred years later is based on 
hearsay evidence rather than published secular arguments.3 
 Meslier accordingly took a major step forward by having 
introduced an entirely new and more credible secular perspective. 
A generation younger than Bayle, he was outspoken in his 
posthumous rejection of the God concept and entirely willing to 
explain why despite his status as a provincial village priest who 
had suppressed his opinion for his entire life.  Upon his suicide, he 
seems to have carefully left on his kitchen table three identical 
copies of his elongated atheist text bearing the title, Testament: 
Memoir of the Thoughts and Sentiments of Jean Meslier, all of them 
having been composed in his meticulous handwriting.  At least 
one of them—and probably more--somehow escaped destruction, 
unlike Tindal’s final text that was earlier destroyed by the Bishop 
of London before it could be published.  The destiny of Meslier’s 
many arguments was more fortunate, especially since copies 
sooner or later fell into the hands of Voltaire and the rest of the 
philosophes linked with the French Enlightenment. 
 
 Meslier began his Testament by profusely apologizing to his 
parishioners for his life-long hypocrisy as an atheist in the guise of 
a Christian priest, and then he launched into a thorough rejection 
of Christian orthodoxy mixed with his indignation against the 
local aristocracy committed to Christian prerogatives.  Contrary to 
received opinion it was not Diderot but Meslier who first declared 
the wish, “that all the rulers of the earth and all the nobles be 
hanged and strangled with the guts of priests.”4 Today, his 
pronouncements continue to be no less striking than at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century.  Unlike Bayle and most other 
English deists, he took pains to make his ideas entirely clear, but 
after his death.  Of course his posthumous reputation would entail 
both social disgrace and certain damnation if his secret atheistic 
vision turned out to be wrong, but he accepted the risk, and in 
 7 
retrospect his choice seems to have been entirely justified in light 
of modern scientific evidence.  In any case, his friends were able to 
bury his body quickly enough in an unmarked grave, his books 
somehow escaped destruction, and his future destiny occurred as 
predicted in his book’s final words:  
 
I already take almost no part in what is done in the world.  
The dead, whom I am about to join, no longer worry about 
anything, they no longer take part in anything, and they no 
longer care about anything.  So, I will finish this with 
nothing.  I am hardly more than nothing and soon I will be 
nothing.”5  
 
And true enough, one suspects, except for the substantial impact 
of his remarkable manuscript in future years.   
 
 Copies of Meslier’s text apparently circulated among an 
expanding readership for three decades before Voltaire provided a 
modified version of its argument within a simpler arrangement 
without fully disclosing Meslier’s uncompromising commitment 
to secular analysis as well as his own mounting indignation 
against the oppressive role of the aristocracy seemingly justified 
by orthodox religion.  In 1761 Voltaire published a truncated 
version roughly half the length of the original text with the 
addition of the subtitle Extrait des Sentiments de Jean Meslier.  In 
retrospect he seems to have wanted to provide a reasoned deist 
manifesto that formulated a secular stance more aggressive than 
his own relatively moderate version.  In any case, both versions of 
Meslier’s text apparently benefitted from a wide circulation.  
 
 A decade later, in 1772, the most controversial atheist at the 
time (who successfully kept his identity unknown throughout his 
life), Baron d’Holbach, published Meslier’s entire manuscript in an 
entirely new edition with the title Le Bons Sens. Moreover, 
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D’Holbach fully restored and featured all atheistic passages but 
excluded the social and political critique.  In one format or another 
the text seems to have circulated throughout later years, and in 
1864, more or less a century afterwards, a complete but flawed 3-
volume version was published as Le Testament de Jean Meslier.  
Only in the eighteen-seventies did a couple of accurate French 
editions become available of the complete text first intended by 
Meslier.6 And Anna Knoop finally translated Voltaire’s truncated 
version into English in 1878, thus becoming Meslier’s received 
standard edition among English and American freethinkers until 
Michael Shreve’s “modern” translation of the complete original 
text as late as 2009, published by Prometheus Books.  
 
 Along with major organizational differences, the thematic 
and stylistic differences between Meslier’s full text and Voltaire’s 
partial version are so distinct that the two can and ought to be 
treated as essentially different books, both of them fully worth the 
effort.  Meslier had organized 97 chapters arbitrarily divided into 
nine topic areas relevant to religion in general inclusive of 
Christian doctrine and practices, whereas Voltaire’s version had 
expanded the organization to 206 more or less aphoristic chapters 
in somewhat random order.  Meslier’s original version as 
translated by Shreve featured elongated and somewhat repetitious 
analysis laced with cautious indignation, whereas Voltaire’s 
version translated by Knoop offered a more aphoristic response 
steeped in aristocratic contempt.   Also, many of Meslier’s 
argumentative sentences seem to have been enlarged to almost a 
couple paragraphs in length, as opposed to Voltaire’s sentences 
which tended to be more aphoristic with a sophisticated and 
relatively impatient audience in mind. Both authors were entirely 
disdainful of religious orthodoxy, but Meslier’s stance can be 
characterized as sustained argument vigorously rooted in outright 
disbelief as opposed to Voltaire’s relentless scorn. 
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 It should be emphasized, however, that the most significant 
difference between the two texts was that Meslier wrote as an 
outspoken atheist whereas Voltaire carefully provided what could 
be interpreted as a deistic revision of Meslier’s intended argument. 
In Voltaire’s text as translated by Knoop, the Hebraic version of 
God promoted by Christians was described as an evil authority 
without disclosing the even more radical alternative intended by 
Meslier that no God whatsoever exists.  In effect, Voltaire quoted 
Meslier to criticize the god concept held by “Christ cultists,” but 
without conceding that no god at all existed in Meslier’s opinion. 
By implication, if God could possess eternal existence, why not the 
universe itself without God.  Voltaire also mentioned the choice of 
individuals driven to the verge of atheism by what seemed the 
cruelty of an angry God: 
 
The priests have made of God such a malicious, ferocious 
being, so ready to be vexed, that there are few men in the 
world who do not wish at the bottom of their hearts that this 
God did not exist.7  
 
Voltaire neglected to mention that this radical possibility had 
already been taken into account by Meslier himself.   
 
 Meslier postponed his effort to make his atheism plain until 
the inception of his third chapter at least in the Shreve translation, 
with two previous chapters having served as long introductory 
essays that provided a broad secular perspective as suggested by 
the following passages: 
 
   Know, then, my friends, that everything that is spouted 
and practiced in the world for the cult and adoration of gods 
is nothing but errors, abuses, illusions, and impostures.  All 
the laws and orders that are issued in the name and 
authority of God or the gods are really only human 
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inventions, just as all the beautiful celebratory pageants and 
sacrifices and divine services and all the other superstitious 
practices of religion and devotion that are done in their 
honor. 
 
 . . . And what I say here in general about the vanity and 
falsity of the religions of the world, I do not say only about 
the foreign and pagan religions, which you already regard as 
false, but I say it also about your Christian religion because, 
in fact, it is no less vain or less false than any other.  I could 
say, in a way, that it is even more vain and more false than 
any other, because there is, perhaps, none so ridiculous or so 
absurd in its principles and principal points than this one, 
and none so opposed to Nature itself and good judgment.8   
 
Arguably, Meslier was simplistic in his critique of religion as 
having been the creation of “shrewd and crafty politicians” rather 
than a collective practice of an entire population that is derivative 
of tribal custom preceding early and modern civilization as later 
confirmed by the numerous findings of modern anthropologists 
and archaeologists beginning with Edward Tylor and Robert 
Lowie. Then again, Meslier’s argument was quite specific relevant 
to both ancient and modern civilization, when “crafty politicians” 
had little difficulty putting “crude old culture” to work in support 
of their seemingly justifiable leadership.  Not surprisingly, Meslier 
suggested that the pursuit of military conquest almost inevitably 
depends on religion’s intensification to justify this collective 
imposition.9  Also, he almost incidentally suggested that the most 
warlike nations are too often the most religious.  
 
 In any case, Meslier was clearly an uncompromising atheist.  
In Chapter 59 he insisted in italics, “That there is no God,” and he 
repeated this categorical insistence in chapters 73, 74, 93, and 94. 
His atheism was everywhere evident in his original text, whether 
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declared or not, and it took exceptional talent on Voltaire’s part in 
softening its analysis to suggest a somewhat conciliatory deist 
rejection of orthodox religious beliefs and practices.   
 
 Meslier primarily justified his loose argument of Testament 
by proposing eight atheistic “proofs” each of which demonstrates 
that religion and Christianity in particular are in all respects 
entirely susceptible to “errors, illusion, and imposture.”  His first 
proof served to concede that all religions have played justified 
roles in their hostility to oppressive political authority. His second 
proof thereupon questioned the excessive reliance on doctored 
scriptures and religion’s similarity to pagan miracles. The third 
proof similarly questioned the validity of visions, sacrifices, and 
divine revelations typical of all religious belief.  The fourth 
featured the obvious inaccuracy of Old and New Testament 
prophesies as well as the dependence on allegorical interpretation 
to justify factual deficiencies.  The fifth specifically examined 
Christian concepts of original sin, the holy trinity, the incarnation 
of God, the concept of transubstantiation, the paradoxical 
existence of hell created by a presumably loving God, and the 
excessive level of commitment emphasized in the character and 
teachings of Christ.  The sixth proof, obviously an extension of the 
first, challenged the use of to ensure the secular authority of 
royalty and the aristocracy.  The seventh emphasized the falsity of 
Christian ontology, and finally the eighth attacked the notion of an 
immortal soul in light of an essentially Lockean version of human 
psychology anticipated by Aristotle. 
 
 In his second proof, Meslier more specifically rejected the 
validity of miracles by exploring in depth all the Old and New 
Testament examples, then compared them to the almost countless 
miracles featured by other religions to prove their own unique 
authenticity, many of them having occurred preceding the New 
Testament and even earlier than the Old Testament.  The pagan 
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miracles of different societies turned out to be very similar--if not 
the same--raising the issue how so many different religions could 
have obtained tangible verification of the singular authority of 
their particular creeds.  Meslier goes on to cite the ancient Jewish 
historian Josephus to the effect that dependence on miracles 
actually “depreciates” a belief and “makes it suspect,” as also 
insisted much later by Gabriel Naudé, “. . . we do not have to 
bother refuting them because they are self negating easily enough 
by their own absurdities.”10  Later, Meslier uses Naudé’s quotation 
of Agobard, the bishop of Lyon in 833 to the effect “that there is 
now nothing too absurd or ridiculous for Christians to believe 
more easily than the pagans ever did in their errors and 
idolatries.”11  Meslier argues that this susceptibility also applies to 
Christ’s miracles.  Concluding-- 
 
. . . Since it would be a very great stupidity to put faith now 
in the so-called miracles of paganism, so likewise is it a very 
great stupidity to put faith in those of Christianity, seeing 
that they both come from the same principle of errors, 
illusions, lies, and impostures.12  
 
Paradoxically, as suggested by Josephus, the validity of a religion 
might be judged by its dependence on stories of miracles and 
divine intervention.  The more excessive the needed credulity, the 
greater the risk of fraud, and with Christianity obviously 
vulnerable to this particular consideration.   
   
 In any case, it is the seventh proof—from chapter 59 to 86 
(pp. 341-530)--that provides the core of Meslier’s philosophical 
argument extending from his deterministic explanation of the 
physical universe to his insistence on the pursuit of a secular ethics 
presumably superior to the submissive obedience of “Christ-
cultists” and “god-cultists” in general.  As proposed by such 
ancient philosophers as Melissus, Parmenides, and Aristotle in his 
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later works upon cosmology, Meslier also insists that the physical 
universe has existed forever without any beginning and therefore 
without having been created by God:  “. . . There is no more reason 
to say that the world and everything in the world was created by 
God than to say that they have always been of themselves and that 
they were formed and arranged of themselves in the state they are 
in, matter having been of itself for all eternity . . .”13  In other 
words, if it is possible that God‘s manifestation can be infinite—
with no beginning, no end--why not the universe itself devoid of 
its creation by God? And if nothing whatsoever has ever been 
created ex nihilo on this basis, the need for a creator becomes 
redundant, so the infinite god-concept in turn becomes no less 
redundant at least to that extent.14  Meslier did not verbalize this 
extra step, but his assumption encouraged such speculation, for 
example by Nietzsche a hundred fifty years later. 
 
 The overall size of the universe, Meslier insisted, is no less 
infinite than its duration.  It lacks any kind of an outer edge 
imposed by God on either a spatial or temporal basis. Moreover, 
he argued, a spiritual God without physical extension is very 
likely incapable of creating the infinite extension of the universe.  
In other words, “What has no extension cannot have created 
extension, which is necessarily infinite.”15 Once again the a priori 
existence of an infinite universe in and of itself makes more sense 
than the concept of a God who supposedly preceded this universe 
and still exists in an eternal realm of His own beyond it. Simply 
enough, if God can be infinite, why cannot the universe itself be 
without a God.  Moreover, the identity of such a God unavoidably 
defies the truism that “what always remains the same, always 
does the same.”16  If this is true, and if God exists, such an infinite 
being has very likely created countless alternative cosmic realms 
additional to the universe we inhabit. Moreover, if God’s role was 
in having created the universe in its entirety, this presumed 
authority becomes totally redundant if the universe has been 
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eternal without having been created by any kind of God. For if 
God can be eternal, why not the universe itself without any need 
for God? All in all, Meslier, argued-- 
 
Again to say that this being [God] is everywhere in its 
immensity although it is found nowhere and to say, 
nevertheless, that it has no parts that correspond to the 
different parts of all this immense space that it contains, but 
that it is all entire everywhere because of its immensity and 
all entire in each part of this immense space because of the 
simplicity and indivisibility of its nature--this is pushing the 
absurdities over the line, it is saying and making things up 
that are not only the most impossible but also the most 
absurd and ridiculous that one could imagine.17  
 
Also essential to Meslier’s materialist teleology was his insistence 
that “being and matter are the same thing.”  More specifically, he 
argued, being (i.e. existence) is the “substantial” manifestation of 
everything while the manner of being is the “formal” aspect of 
everything.  Today, his more or less Cartesian distinction seems 
primitive compared to the principles of relativity and quantum 
mechanics suggested a few decades ago by Einstein and others.  
However, there is no difficulty in extending his definition of 
matter to the composition of the universe as both an energy field 
and an infinite aggregate of particles as demonstrated by the 
alternative theories of light by Newton and Huygens, also by the 
ancient theories of atomism first suggested by Democritus as 
compared to the infinite physical extension featured by Aristotle 
and Melissus. For if the basic “stuff” of the universe consists of a 
multitude of particles comprising an energy field, Meslier’s 
definition seems entirely defensible even today.   
 
 Meslier did take into account Democritus’ notion of atoms 
that had been revived for modern use a few decades earlier by 
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Gassendi, “that matter exists and can be divided into an infinite 
number of parts that you can, if you want, call atoms; and it is sure 
that the parts of matter actually move.” Two paragraphs later, 
Meslier added, “So, it is much more appropriate to attribute to 
matter itself the force that it has to move than to vainly and 
needlessly be burdened with so many insurmountable difficulties 
searching outside it for a false principle of its movement.”18 In 
other words, nature’s extraordinary harmony is entirely the 
product of natural laws arranged and modified by determinate 
physical control: 
 
Natural reason proves that everything that is most beautiful, 
most perfect, and most wonderful in nature can be made by 
the natural laws of movement alone and by the different 
configurations of the parts of matter variously arranged, 
united, and modified or combined in all kinds of beings that 
make what we call the world.19   
 
Without exception, all these presumed miracles derive from the 
“moving force of matter alone” rather than anthropomorphic 
intelligence, and this materialist force necessarily involves chance 
and fortune rather than divine intelligence: 
 
 To say that all these things are conducted in their 
movements and in the production of their effects by a 
supreme intelligence is a pure illusion and a pure fiction of 
the human mind and is not based on any true reason, since 
we clearly see that all this can be done naturally by the 
moving force of matter alone, which moves itself and acts 
blindly everywhere without knowing what it is doing or 
why it is doing it.20  
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In a later chapter Meslier once again featured the connection 
between nature’s beauty and the dynamics between mass and 
force in nature:  
 
It is also clear and evident that all these different effects or 
works that we see in Nature are made by the movement of 
matter and by the different assemblies, unions, and 
modifications of its parts. . . .  And since this movement of 
matter can only come from matter itself . . ., and since this 
union and division of matter is only a natural result of its 
movement and of the regular or irregular movement of its 
parts, it follows that the formation itself of all these beautiful 
and admirable works of nature does not at all demonstrate 
or prove the existence of an infinitely perfect God.21  
 
And just a page later: 
 
Is it not possible that all this multitude of parts always 
moves in this way without being mixed up and running into 
one another, joining, binding, stopping, and attaching 
together in many kinds of ways and so starting to compose 
all these different works that we see in Nature, which could 
then be perfected and strengthened by the continuation of 
the same movements that started to produce them.22   
 
Meslier went on to insist that water, fire, smoke, plants, animals, 
and all productions of nature can be explained on this basis--
pretty much as Bacon had suggested a century earlier.  
 
 Meslier also seems to have anticipated the link between 
atomism and the issue of force—now described as energy—by 
means of an explanation that anticipated future investigation of 
sub-atomic behavior.23  He rejected the “first mover” suppositions 
of creationists as “false principles,” though of course today’s Big 
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Bang theory more or less seems to confirm these suppositions.  He 
did concede that God could have performed an event comparable 
to the “big bang” in order to set the stage for the entire process 
that has followed at all levels of existence.  Then again, he argued 
that it seemed more likely this occurrence took place without the 
involvement of any kind of God. 
 
 As earlier suggested, Meslier’s analysis can be further 
expanded based on the likelihood that countless universes do exist 
in a more inclusive plenum, all of which first manifest themselves 
through the inception of big bangs dominated by force (or energy) 
and much later culminate as black holes of concentrated matter a 
hundred billion years later, give or take a few thousand. Relative 
to the cosmos in its entirety, each universe is little more than an 
enormous surge of energy that consolidates, then turns to ash in a 
vast realm of other such flashes that rise and fall in a comparable 
manner.  Here the anthropomorphic god-concept becomes, if 
anything a personification too miniscule to explain the vast cosmic 
dynamics that occur on what might seem an inconceivable scale.  
 
 By emphasizing the authority of a God both perfect and all-
powerful as explained by Meslier, creationists effectively accept 
the paradox that God is morally unassailable despite anything that 
“goes wrong” in light of His limitless authority. Perhaps resulting 
from France’s social crisis at the turn of the eighteenth century, 
Meslier insisted that a truly virtuous all-powerful God could not 
have permitted society and its institutions to have declined to such 
an extent-- 
 
 Now, it is evident that the world is almost completely 
filled up with evils and miseries.  The men here are all full of 
vices, errors, and viciousness; their governments are full of 
injustices and tyrannies.  We see a torrent of vices and 
viciousness; discord and division reign almost everywhere.  
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The just and innocent are oppressed and groan almost 
everywhere; the poor are almost everywhere in death and 
suffering, without support and consolation. 
 
    On the other hand, we often see the vicious, impious 
and those most unworthy of living, nevertheless enjoy 
prosperity, delight and honors, and an abundance of all 
kinds of goods. . .. So it is evident that the world is almost 
everywhere filled up with nothing but evils, miseries, vices, 
viciousness, cheating, injustice, robbery, larceny, cruelty, 
tyranny, imposture, lies, discord, and confusion, it is a 
certain and evident proof that there is no infinitely good and 
wise being who is capable of bringing suitable relief and, 
consequently, there is no all-powerful being who is infinitely 
good and wise, as our Christ-cultists claim.24  
 
 In Meslier’s opinion the contradiction as described here is thus 
unsustainable, demonstrating the non-existence of God beyond 
Descartes’ concept of a “malicious demon,” not that Meslier 
seriously took into account this particular vision of supernatural 
authority:  
 
By wanting to make [God] perfect and . . . to make him seem 
grand, admirable, and incomprehensible in all things and in 
all ways, they destroy him.  And by wanting to strip him 
and relieve him of all imperfections and all real and 
imaginable qualities, they annihilate him and truly reduce 
him to nothing.  Why do they not just honestly recognize 
and simply admit that he is nothing and does not exist, 
seeing that he really is nothing and really does not exist?25  
 
Paradoxically, Meslier suggested, god cultists end up proving 
nothing in their effort to explain everything. They actually engage 
in a collective delusion that Meslier described as shared psychosis: 
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“Believing that they become wiser in spiritualizing their God so 
finely, they become more insane than they were,” since “their so-
called sovereign beatitude consisted only in an imaginary 
happiness and bliss and not in a real and true happiness and 
beatitude.”26  Moreover, Meslier insisted, Christ-cultists try to 
explain away the multitude of “vices and viciousness in both men 
and beasts by emphasizing God’s status as an infinitely perfect 
being that permits evil to exist in order to obtain spiritual 
perfection.  If a generous and loving God actually exists, Meslier 
suggested, “Would it not be a far greater good and far more 
worthy of the glory, honor, and pleasure of an all-powerful, 
infinitely perfect God to make all his creatures completely happy 
and perfect?”  But of course such a God does not exist, so an 
elaborate lie becomes necessary to describe the role of a perfect 
God in charge of an imperfect universe.27  
 
 According to Meslier, Christ-cultists and most other god-
cultists primarily advocate the delusion of God’s supposed power 
to rectify Nature’s blatant disparities by rewarding its victims with 
eternal joy and punishing their persecutors with eternal 
punishment in hell--not to omit the possibility of a third realm, 
Purgatory, as a preliminary zone of punishment less horrific than 
hellfire.  All three of these transcendent zones supposedly exist in 
an extraterrestrial domain totally inaccessible to mankind except 
upon dying.  Meslier thus rejected this almost universal belief in 
an afterlife featured by most religions as “a kind of madness that 
often enough approaches fanaticism.”28 Instead, he resorted to 
essentially the same argument as the ancient natural historian 
Pliny already proposed in the first century A.D.: “All men are in 
the same state from their last day onward as they were before their 
first day, and neither body nor mind possesses any sensation after 
death, any more than it did before birth.”29 In Meslier’s words,  
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[After death} we will all return to the state we were in before 
we were born or before we existed, and just as at that time 
we thought about nothing, imagined nothing, and were 
nothing, so also after death we will think about nothing, feel 
nothing, and imagine nothing any more.”30  
 
Moreover, we are already “experts” in death, having been devoid 
of life for countless centuries before they were born.  After we die, 
we can expect to return to exactly the same limbo from whence we 
came, just as devoid of consciousness as before we were born.  
Surprisingly, Meslier quoted Ecclesiastes to confirm his 
assessment:  
 
The dead know nothing and they wait for no reward; no 
feelings of hatred or love or any desire at all affect them and 
they take part no longer in all that is done in the world.  Go, 
then, in peace and joy to enjoy the goods that you have!  
Drink and eat the fruits of your labor in peace and rejoice 
with your friends and loved ones; for, that is all the good 
you can hope for in life.31  
 
In effect, live while you can, for when you’re dead you will be 
truly lifeless--just as dead as all other creatures upon their life’s 
cessation. 
 
 Meslier went on to ask how and why a God who puts so 
much emphasis upon virtue and obedience in mankind cannot 
“make itself sufficiently known to men. . . . For, if it makes itself 
sufficiently known, no one would be ignorant of, deny, and doubt 
its existence; and so, there would not be as many disputes as there 
are among men about its so-called existence.”32 Why, in effect, did 
God intentionally confuse people able to recognize all the 
contradictions implicit in Christian belief when these were exactly 
the people the most deserving of acceptance in heaven? Meslier 
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complained, in fact, that, “ . . . there is not any divinity [among 
modern societies] that makes itself or its intentions and will 
sufficiently known to men.”33 The simple answer, Meslier 
proposes, is the fact that such a God simply does not exist. 
 
 In his fifth proof Meslier actually went so far as to ridicule 
Christ as an ignorant impostor, “a nobody who had no talent, no 
mind, no learning, no skill, and who was appropriately despised 
in the world.”  Moreover, he argued that those who believe in 
Christ “ascribe divinity to a fool, a madman, a wretched fanatic, 
and a miserable scoundrel.”34 Meslier instead praised the accuracy 
of contemporaries who described Christ as having been possessed 
by a demon.35  Moreover, he ridicules Christ’s pretension that he 
himself was the one and only son of God destined to rule Jews 
eternally.36  If the god-concept was totally misguided because 
there is no God—His identity has always been entirely mythical, 
and it could only have been hopelessly delusional in predicting, 
for example, that his disciples could observe him “coming down 
from the sky with his angels, full of glory and power, with the 
majesty to judge [i.e. to govern].”37 No less delusional, Meslier 
added, was Christ’s promise to his disciples that they would soon 
join him by “sit [ting] on a dozen thrones to judge” and that all 
those who abandoned their families to follow him would thereby 
achieve eternal life--in other words go to heaven.38  Surprisingly, 
Meslier neglected to mention Christ’s prediction of Judgment Day 
39when he would actually sit at the side of God in the task of 
consigning almost the entirety of mankind to eternal hellfire. Also 
relevant, Meslier suggested, was Christ’s assertion, “I am the way: 
I am truth and I am life; no one comes to the Father except by 
me.”40 Here Christ declared in effect that access to heaven was 
only possible through belief in his unique role as the Son of God.  
On Judgment Day all individuals unable to accept Christ’s unique 
holy status would be consigned to hell by God, a fate that would 
supposedly occur within a single lifetime of Christ’s warning.  
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Again, Meslier insisted, if the god-concept was defunct, all of this 
prophetic wisdom could also be discounted.  
 
 In his eighth and final proof, Meslier challenged the concept 
of the soul.  According to orthodox believers, the relationship 
between physical anatomy and the incorporeal soul necessarily 
converges in the human mind, effectively confirming the belief in 
God’s final authority in spiritual matters. Needless to say, Meslier 
vigorously rejected this rationale, especially as articulated by 
Descartes and Malebranche, both of whom refused to accept the 
secular definition “that matter is capable of thinking, willing, 
feeling, desiring and loving, or hating, etc.” on the assumption 
that all these mental functions transcend the physical dimensions 
of length, width, and depth.41  In Meslier’s opinion, the key 
oversight of these and others identified as Cartesians was their 
failure to recognize that “the modifications alone of matter 
produce all our thoughts, knowledge, and sensations.”42 This 
distinction enabled Meslier to extend the principle of 
consciousness to animals as well as humanity: 
 
. . . It is not in any measurable extension or in any external 
shape of matter that the knowledge and sensations of men 
and beasts consist, but in the various internal movement, 
agitations, and modifications that matter has in men and 
beasts.43  
 
Meslier also extended this principle to all processes of thought, 
specifically listing desire, love, hate, joy, sadness, pleasure, pain, 
fear, and hope, and he proposed that this mental capacity is more 
advanced in some than in others:  “These modifications consist in 
the faculty or facility that some living beings have to think and 
reason; and this faculty or facility is greater, i.e., clearer and freer, 
in some more than others.”44  
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 As explained by Meslier, the mind derives from “subtle, 
restless matter,” and upon death it loses its capacity to sustain 
these modifications.  Meslier quotes Montaigne to the effect that 
“all thoughts, judgments and alterations of our bodies . . . are 
continual,” and explains more specifically, “that the soul is not a 
spiritual, intelligent and sentient substance in itself and it is not a 
substance different from matter.”45 Instead, it is entirely derivative 
of matter but at a more intricate level: 
 
What we call “our soul” can be nothing else but a portion of 
the finest, subtlest, and most restless matter of our body, 
which is mixed up and modified in a certain way with 
another, cruder matter with which it composes an organic 
body and by its constant restlessness gives it life, movement, 
and sentiment.46   
 
And exactly so.  For it turns out that Meslier’s words “agitation” 
and “modifications of matter” far better describe the biological 
activity that takes place with the occurrence of thought than the 
less functional dynamics of spiritual transcendence.  If brain cells 
can be identified as “matter,” and if the interaction among these 
material brain cells can be identified as an intricate process of 
neural “modification,” then Meslier’s materialist definition of 
mind (hence soul) is far more relevant to thought than the Platonic 
notion of spiritual transcendence.     
 
 What neither Descartes nor Meslier knew was the simple 
truth now taken for granted that the brain is very much a part of 
the body and that it functions based on an intricate interplay of 
electricity in transmission, in effect little more than an intricate 
neural process ultimately linked with magnetism.  At the time, 
nobody had any idea of electricity’s essential role in mental 
behavior dependent on the human brain, roughly three pounds in 
weight, containing at least 15 to 33 billion neurons with up to 
 24 
10,000 synaptic connections apiece all of which are more or less 
interconnected by a sufficient flow of electricity.  For in fact 
numerous studies indicate the human brain includes as many as 
two hundred billion brain cells called neurons, each of which 
possesses countless dendritic spines that serve as filaments linked 
with other brain cells. Whatever the number, each of these brain 
cells transmit messages to others by means of an electrical circuit 
rendered possible by the metabolic interaction between oxygen 
and glycogen, both of which are delivered to the brain by means 
of blood carried by the arteries.  As all students in freshman 
college physiology learn (myself included), neural interaction 
occurs and thinking becomes possible as long as blood delivers 
oxygen and glycogen to the brain. Once this delivery ceases, for 
example resulting from a stroke or heart attack, the mind 
terminates, often just about as quickly as a TV screen goes dark 
when it is turned off.   
 
 Afferent nerves deliver to the brain all the sense organ data 
needed to think and make choices and efferent nerves deliver the 
appropriate messages to the limbs that can do what is needed. 
This applies to walking, eating, and throwing stones, but also to 
emoting and thinking abstract thoughts.  All consciousness is 
mental behavior effectively steered by the brain, even for creatures 
as primitive as worms and bedbugs, whose neural apparatus 
functions at a far more simple level. Granted many exceptions, the 
complexity of thought is more or less proportional to the number 
of brain cells brought into play on this basis.  People might be 
better and more effectively endowed than other creatures, but this 
is entirely a matter of degree, and in all instances the brain’s 
function is strictly connected with that of the body. For brain cells 
are necessarily comparable to other body cells in their structure 
and performance dependent on glycogen and oxygen.  So, yes, 
Meslier’s abstractions anticipated modern scientific findings with 
remarkable accuracy.  Today, any scientific grant proposal to 
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measure the soul’s ineffable manifestation in its departure from 
the human body once death occurs would be ruinous to the 
reputation of whoever ventures to submit such a proposal.  
 
 Meslier fully conceded human fallibility as the best and most 
defensible excuse for religion.  In the simplest possible words he 
summed up the paradox of human nature with almost universal 
relevance, “People need to be ignorant of many truths and believe 
in many falsehoods.47  So exactly what kind of an ethics did he 
propose to bridge the inevitable gap between believers and non-
believers? One suspects he was willing to tolerate the freedom of 
compulsive believers to confirm their dependence on religion, but 
not at the expense of non-believers who reject the gratification 
provided by obvious misinformation.  Honesty and human 
decency remained the most important traits to be cultivated in 
Meslier’s opinion—more or less as featured by Aristotle in his 
Nicomachean Ethics. As the best and most appropriate human 
behavior instead of religion, Meslier accordingly in chap. 96, more 
or less his book’s conclusion,  
 
You will be happy if you follow the rules, maxims, and 
precepts of this only wise and true religion.  But I dare say, 
although I am not prophet, that you and your descendants 
will always be miserable and unhappy as long as you follow 
any other religion than this.  You and your descendants will 
always be miserable and unhappy as long as you suffer the 
domination of tyrants and the errors, abuses, and vain 
superstitions of the cult of the gods and their idols.48  
 
As Meslier fully expected, religion and patriotism have continued 
to thrive over the following centuries among the world’s populace 
at large. Nevertheless, the possibility of human improvement does 
seem possible among the populace able and willing to enhance 
their circumstances on a truly objective basis.  It was Meslier’s 
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unique achievement that his manuscript released upon his suicide 
set the stage for a substantial breakthrough in secular idealism 
first in France during the Enlightenment, later elsewhere across 
the world. 
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